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DISCUSSIONS
Normative Reasons without (Good)
Reasoning*
Artūrs Logins
According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F,
just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents
two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.
I. THE GOOD REASONING VIEW
According to an increasingly popular view, normative reasons, that is, the
considerations that speak in favor of some response, are defined/ex-
plained in terms of good patterns of reasoning.1 The focus of this article
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would also like to thank Julien Dutant, Benoit Gaultier, Edgar Phillips, Jacques Vollet, and
audiences at the Autumn 2018 Workshop of the Epistemology Research Group (GRÉ) of
the Chair in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Knowledge, Collège de France, Paris, and
at the Thumos Seminar, September 2018, University of Geneva, for very helpful discussions.
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1. Recent defenses of the good reasoning view of reasons include Kieran Setiya, Rea-
sons without Rationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Kieran Setiya,
“What Is a Reason to Act?,” Philosophical Studies 167 (2014): 221–35; Jonathan Way, “Rea-
sons as Premises of Good Reasoning,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2017): 251–70;
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, “Fittingness First,” Ethics 126 (2016): 575–606; and Sam-
uel Asarnow, “The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning,” Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 95 (2017): 614–36. The view is not new, though. Classic defenses of this
general sort of approach include Joseph Raz, introduction to Practical Reasoning, ed. Joseph
Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1–17; Bernard Williams, “Internal and Exter-
nal Reasons,” reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
chap. 8, 101–13; and Pamela Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” Journal of Philosophy
102 (2005): 437–57, among others.
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is specifically on what appears to be the most promising recent version of
the reasoning view of normative reasons, (RV), according to which “for
that p to be a reason for a response is for that p to be a premise of a good
pattern of reasoning from fitting responses to that response.”2
In this article I aim to show that (RV), as elaborated by McHugh and
Way, faces two as-yet-unnoticed but fundamental counterexamples. These
two arise given two of McHugh and Way’s (independently plausible) com-
mitments in particular. Thefirst commitment is the claim that reasoning is a
transition frompremise responses to conclusion responses of a certain sort.
According to them, “This transition is such that the conclusion response
counts as based on, or held in the light of, the premise responses.”3 The
second commitment is the claim that all normative reasons are contents
of possible true beliefs or of other fitting premise responses. According to
McHugh and Way, a fitting belief is a true belief. They don’t require that
all of the relevant premise responses are actually held by the subject for
the content of the relevant premise responses to be normative reasons
for the subject in question. (RV) focuses on patterns of reasoning. (RV) re-
quires that all of the relevant premise responses are fitting and are part of a
good pattern of reasoning—that is, that there is a possible reasoning (for a
given subject) from the relevant (not necessarily actually held) fitting prem-
ise responses to the relevant conclusion responses that respects the criteria
for a goodpattern of reasoning.Howexactly the goodpatterns of reasoning
are defined is not crucial for our purposes here.
II. OBJECTION FROM MOORE-PARADOXICAL BELIEFS
The first of our counterexamples appeals to possible considerations of
the Moore-paradoxical form. Consider the following example. The fact
that (r) “the building is on fire, but John doesn’t believe that the building
is on fire” is, intuitively, a reason for John to check/consider/reconsider/
investigate the hypothesis (h) “the building is on fire.” Yet, there is no pos-
sible good pattern of reasoning for John from a fitting belief in (r) to re-
considering/investigation/etc. of (h). This is so simply because it is not
possible for John to have a fitting belief that the building is on fire and
that he doesn’t believe that the building is on fire. John cannot have a fit-
ting belief that (r) because it is impossible for such a belief to be true.One
cannot truly believe that the building is on fire and that one doesn’t be-
lieve that the building is on fire. The belief in the first conjunct contra-
dicts the belief in the second. On the (RV) account, given that John can-
not (in any sense) have a true belief in (r), (r) cannot possibly be a reason
for any response fromhim.However, it appears pretheoretically plausible
2. McHugh and Way, “Fittingness First,” 586; emphasis slightly modified.
3. McHugh and Way, “Fittingness First,” 586.
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to think that (r) speaks in favor of some response for John. Given that the
fittingness requirement is central for (RV), the Moore-paradoxical beliefs
constitute a non-negligible challenge for the reasoning view.
III. OBJECTION FROM SELF-UNDERMINING BELIEFS
The second sort of counterexample appeals to the possibility of other
self-undermining beliefs. The fact that (p) “I just took a drug that erased
all of mymemories about the past fiveminutes” is, intuitively, a reason for
me to suspend judgment about what I did in these past five minutes (as-
suming that I haven’t learned anything new after that yet). However, to
suspend judgment about what I did in these past five minutes entails sus-
pending judgment about whether I took the memory-erasing drug. But
there is no good pattern of reasoning from a belief that p toward a sus-
pension of judgment about p. Such a transition (if possible) doesn’t sat-
isfy the basic criteria for reasoning. In fact, McHugh and Way define rea-
soning as a transition where the conclusion response is held in the light,
or on the basis, of the premise response. In this case, however, I cannot
base my suspension about p on my belief that p. To suspend judgment
about whether I took the memory-erasing drug cannot be based on the
belief that I took the memory-erasing drug. At the very moment when I
would suspend the judgment, I would lose the basis for the suspension,
and it would not count as being held in the light of the relevant premise
response. It is not possible to believe that p and at the same time to sus-
pend judgment about p. If the fact that I just took a drug that erased
all of my memories about the past five minutes is a reason for me to sus-
pend judgment about what I did during these past five minutes, then
(RV)must be false, since it entails that it cannot be a reason forme to sus-
pend judgment.
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